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Comments
On Executive Clemency: The Pardon
of Richard M. Nixon
. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 17, 1972, James W. McCord, Jr., Bernard Barker, Frank
A. Sturgis, Virgilio R. Gonzales, and Eugenio R. Martinez were
caught with cameras, electronic surveillance equipment, and se-
quenced one hundred dollar bills within the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters in the Watergate Hotel.' This was the
fourth attempted break-in at Democratic National Committee
Headquarters, the previous three attempts having taken place on
May 26, May 27, and May 28, 1972. For almost a year thereafter,
the Nixon Administration absolutely denied White House involve-
ment in the break-in.
On March 21, 1973, the flat denials of White House involvement
were beginning to become somewhat qualified as more evidence re-
garding the break-in was adduced. President Richard M. Nixon
stated that he had begun intensive new inquiries after new charges
had been brought to his attention, and that he had personally
ordered all those conducting the investigation into the break-in to
1. All factual sequences, unless otherwise cited, are drawn from Linda
Amster's "Chronology of Watergate Related Events", found in THE WroTE
HOUSE TRANSCRIPTS (New York Times Co., Ed., Bantam Books, Inc., 1974)
at 813-77.
get all the facts and report them directly to him. The three princi-
pal investigators, L. Patrick Gray, Acting Director of the FBI,
Richard G. Kleindienst, United States Attorney General, and Henry
E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice
Department's Watergate inquiry, all denied receiving such a direc-
tive.
Further qualifications of White House involvement were forth-
coming: all previous White House comments on Watergate were
rendered inoperative on April 17, 1973; the denial of involvement
was limited to the President and key aides on April 23, 1973; Presi-
dent Nixon accepted responsibility for the break-in and coverup but
denied involvement on April 30, 1973; President Nixon on June 26,
1973 denied knowing of the coverup until March 21, 1973; and Pres-
ident Nixon denied guilt on August 15, 1973. During this time, a
number of key personnel (Jeb Stuart Magruder, Deputy Director
for the Committee to Re-elect the President, John D. Erlichman,
chief domestic affairs advisor to the President, H. R. Haldeman,
White House Chief of Staff, John W. Dean, counsel to President
Nixon, Gray, and Kleindienst) departed from their administrative
posts.
On July 16, 1973, Alexander P. Butterfield, former presidential
appointments secretary, revealed that President Nixon had taped
all his conversations and telephone calls since 1970. This was con-
firmed by Fred J. Buzhardt, Jr., the President's special counsel.
Archibald Cox, who had been appointed Watergate Special Prosecu-
tor on May 18, 1973, indicated his desire to listen to several of these
conversations by obtaining a subpoena for eight of them on July
23, 1973, and a Show Cause Order on July 26, 1973 when the Presi-
dent would not comply with the subpoena. On August 29, 1973,
United States District Judge John J. Sirica ordered President Nixon
to turn over the subpoenaed tapes,2 and on October 12, 1973, Judge
Sirica's order was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.8
On October 19, 1973, President Nixon proposed a compromise
which Cox viewed as being unacceptable. Cox's particular view
of the situation resulted in his termination from the federal payroll
on October 20, 1973, but only after Elliot L. Richardson, United
States Attorney General, and William D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant
United States Attorney General, resigned from the Attorney Gen-
2. In Re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), mod. and
aff'd, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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eral's office rather than comply with President Nixon's order to
fire Cox.
On October 22, 1973, the House Judiciary Committee began its
inquiry regarding the possible impeachment of President Nixon.
By April 25, 1974, the Committee was not only investigating the
Watergate burglary and coverup, but also Nixon's personal finan-
ces, the ITT affair, the dairy industry fund, the Howard Hughs do-
nation, and the Vesco contribution.
Between April 16 and 18, 1974, Leon Jaworski, who had been
appointed as the second Watergate Special Prosecutor on November
1, 1973, requested and was granted a subpoena for tapes and docu-
ments of sixty-four presidential conversations. 4 On April 30, 1974,
although transcripts of the tapes were released by the White House,
the White House announced that it would refuse to comply with
Jaworski's subpoena. This dispute was eventually resolved by a
unanimous United States Supreme Court on July 24, 1974, when
it ordered Nixon to surrender the subpoenaed tapes and documents
"forthwith".5
Shortly thereafter, between July 27 and July 30, 1974, the House
Judiciary Committee approved Articles of Impeachment charging
President Nixon with violations of his oath of office by obstruction
of justice, abuse of his presidential powers, and contempt of Con-
gress. 6
4. United States v. Nixon, 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 418
U.S. 683 (1974).
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
6. 32 CONG. Q., No. 31 at 2007-14 (Aug. 3, 1974). Three Articles of Im-
peachment were approved by the Committee.
Article I charged the President with obstruction of justice and was ap-
proved by a 27-11 vote on July 27, 1974.
Article II charged the President with abuse of his presidential powers,
and was approved by a 28-10 vote on July 29, 1974. This Article essen-
tially charged President Nixon with violations of the civil rights of various
citizens by conduct which included:
1. Attempting to obtain confidential Internal Revenue Service rec-
ords and attempting to cause audits or other discriminatory tax
investigations of certain citizens;
2. Directing improper electronic surveillance by the FBI, Secret
Service, and other personnel, and concealing the records thereof;
3. Authorizing and allowing the creation of the White House
"Plumbers" unit;
4. Failing to act when he knew of illegal actions by his close aides
and subordinates;
On August 5, 1974, while in the process of surrendering the
subpoenaed tapes, President Nixon acknowledged facts which made
him a party to obstruction of justice.7 On August 8, 1974, President
Nixon announced his resignation from office because he ". . . no
longer [had] a strong enough political base in the Congress . .."
to justify his continuing in office, thus becoming the first President
in the history of the United States to resign. s
On September 8, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford, stating that
... it is common knowledge that serious allegations and accusa-
tions hang like a sword over our former President's head, and
threaten his health as he tries to reshape his life, a great part of
which was spent in the service of this country and by the mandate
of its people . . 9
... granted ... a full, free, and absolute pardon onto Richard
Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard
Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in dur-
ing the period from January 10, 1969 through August 9, 1974.10
5. Interfering with the FBI, the Justice Department, the Special
Prosecutor, and the CIA in their lawful operations.
Article III (also called the McClory Act) charged the President with Con-
tempt of Congress, and was approved by a 21-17 vote on July 30, 1974. The
Article was based on President Nixon's refusal to produce subpoenaed ma-
terials relevant to ". . . presidential direction, knowledge, or approval of
actions demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial grounds for im-
peachment." Id. at 2014.
7. 32 CONG. Q., No. 32 at 2071 (Aug. 10, 1974). A tape of a conversa-
tion with H.R. Haldeman on July 23, 1972, six days after the Watergate
break-in, indicated that Nixon approved the invocation of CIA involvement
as a means of obstructing the FBI's investigation of Watergate.
-2 8. Id. at 2071-72. When announcing his resignation, President Nixon
never mentioned the impeachment proceedings against him.
9. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 12, col. 3. All citations
to the Los Angeles Times are to the Morning Edition.
10. 39 Fed. Reg. 32601-02 (1974). The full text of the pardon is as fol-
lows:
"Richard Nixon became the thirty-seventh President of the United
States on January 20, 1969 and was reelected in 1972 for a second term by
the electors of forty-nine of the fifty states. His term in office continued
until his resignation on August 9, 1974.
"Pursuant to resolutions of the House of Representatives, its Committee
on the Judiciary conducted an inquiry and investigation on the impeach-
ment of the President extending over more than eight months. The hear-
ings of the Committee and its deliberations, which received wide national
publicity over television, radio, and in printed media, resulted in votes ad-
verse to Richard Nixon on recommended Articles of Impeachment.
"As a result of certain acts or omissions occurring before his resignation
from the Office of President, Richard Nixon has become liable to possible
indictment and trial for offenses against the United States. Whether or not
he shall be so prosecuted depends on the findings of the appropriate grand
jury and on the discretion of the authorized prosecutor. Should an indict-
ment ensue, the accused shall then be entitled to a fair trial by an impartial
jury, as guaranteed to every individual by the Constitution.
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Mr. Nixon purportedly accepted the pardon in a statement in which
he stated that he "... was wrong in not acting more decisively
and forthrightly in dealing with Watergate . . .", and that he now
understood how his own "mistakes and misjudgments" contributed
to and seemed to support the belief that his ". . . motivations and
actions in the Watergate affair were intentionally self-serving and
illegal."'"
"It is believed that a trial of Richard Nixon, if it became necessary, could
not fairly begin until a year or more has elapsed. In the meantime, the
tranquility to which this nation has been restored by the events of recent
weeks could be irreparably lost by the prospects of bringing to trial a former
President of the United States. The prospects of such trial will cause pro-
longed and divisive debate over the propriety of exposing to further punish-
ment and degradation a man who has already paid the unprecedented pen-
alty of relinquishing the highest elective office of the United States.
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States,
pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2,
of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full, free,
and absolute pardon unto Richard, Nixon for all offenses against the United
States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or
taken part in during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9,
1974.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eighth day
of September, in the year of our Lord Nineteen hundred and seventy-four,
and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred
and ninety-ninth."
11. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 13, col. 3-4. The full
text of Mr. Nixon's statement is as follows:
"I have been informed that President Ford has granted me a full and
absolute pardon for any charges which might be brought against me for
actions taken during the time I was President of the United States.
"In accepting this pardon, I hope that his compassionate act will con-
tribute to lifting the burden of Watergate from our country.
"Here in California, my perspective on Watergate is quite different than
it was while I was embattled in the midst of the controversy, and while
I was still subject to the unrelenting daily demands of the Presidency itself.
"Looking back on what is still in my mind a complex and confusing maze
of events, decisions, pressures and personalities, one thing that I can see
clearly now is that I was wrong in not acting more decisively and forth-
rightly in dealing with Watergate, particularly when it reached the stage
of judicial proceedings and grew from a political scandal into a national
tragedy.
"No words can describe the depths Of my regret and pain at the anguish
my mistakes over Watergate have caused the nation and the Presidency-
a nation I. so deeply love and an institution I so greatly respect.
"I know many fair-minded people believe that my motivations and actions
in the Watergate affair were intentionally self-serving and illegal. I now
understand how my own mistakes and misjudgments have contributed to
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The pardon of Richard M. Nixon has raised many doubts and
questions, not only as to the propriety of the pardon but also as
to its validity. It is the purpose of this comment to examine Nixon's
pardon and its acceptance in the light of historical and contempo-
rary perspectives, and in the light of contemporary legal trends
which have more accurately defined the executive power in gen-
eral.
II. THE POWER TO PARDON
Without question, President Ford has the power to grant pardons.
The United States Constitution provides that the President "...
shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."' 2 The
power is said to be essentially the same as that exercised by the
representatives of the British Crown, from which the United States
derived its own system of Common Law," and it is also said to
belong to the executive alone. 14
A. Offenses Against the United States
Mr. Nixon's pardon was necessarily limited only to crimes he
committed against the United States. The pardon will not excuse
him for crimes which he might have committed against the individ-
ual states.-"
There are indications that a state could refuse to give any effect
that belief aaid seemed to support it. This burden is the heaviest one of
all to bear.
"That the way I tried to deal with Watergate was the wrong way is a
burden I shall bear for every day of the life that is left to me."
12. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
13. Ex Parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517, 519 (1883).
14. United States v. Klien, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).
This observation is not entirely accurate as an absolute. At one time it
was felt that the suspension of a -sentence by a court was an interference
with both executive and legislative authority as fixed by the Constitution.
Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916). The federal courts now
possess this power, except where the sentence is death or life imprisonment.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3651.
Further, it has been recognized that Congress has the power to pass gen-
eral acts of amnesty, this situation being encountered most often in cases
where statutory immunity is offered in exchange for testimony. See Brown
v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896). The legislature also exercises the power
of clemency to a certain extent by making provisions for parole, which is
essentially a commutation of sentence. See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 4201;
18 U.S.C.A. § 4203 (a).
15. The President has no power of pardon over a crime which is not
an offense against the United States; such power lies only with the state.
In Re Bocchiaro, 49 F. Supp. 37, 38 (W.D.N.Y. 1943)Y.
[VOL. 2: 353, 1975] Executive Clemency
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to a presidential pardon. People ex. rel. Prisament v. Brophy'
involved the question of whether one who had committed a state
offense could be sentenced as a second offender on the basis of a
previous federal conviction which had been absolutely pardoned by
the President of the United States. The Court held that the pardon
was no bar to the imposition of such a sentence, and stated that
... the state may determine as it sees fit both the effect that shall
be given to the previous conviction and the effect that shall be
given to a presidential pardon for that offense.iT
It may be argued that a state may logically apply this line of
reasoning to the entire area of state affairs. If a state may deter-
mine as it sees fit the effect which shall be given a presidential
pardon, in effect what is being said is that the pardon, at the state's
option, may be held to be of no effect with regard to matters ex-
clusively within the jurisdiction of the states. Thus, while a par-
doned offender may be restored to rights and privileges guaranteed
by the federal Constitution, with regard to rights and privileges
which are not deemed so fundamental as to be applicable to the
states, the states may continue to look at the pardoned offender
as a convicted (or unconvicted, as the case may be) criminal.
The proposition is not as academic as it may seem. For example,
the California State Bar Association had initiated disciplinary pro-
ceedings against Mr. Nixon on the basis of his role in the Watergate
scandal. Mr. Nixon then attempted to resign from the State Bar,
but the Board of Governors recommended rejection of his resigna-
tion because of his failure to acknowledge that there were discipli-
nary proceedings pending against him.'
The Board of Governors' actions impliedly expressed their opin-
ion that Nixon's absolute pardon would not preclude his disbar-
ment. At least in the eyes of the State Bar, Mr. Nixon was
obviously not a "new man" because of his pardon.
Such an attitude on the part of the states serves their interests
in that it protects their institutions from unscrupulous persons who
16. 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468 (1941), cert. den. 317 U.S. 625 (1942).
17. Id. at 138, 38 N.E.2d at 471.
18. Nixon's resignation was eventually accepted when he acknowledged
the pendency of disciplinary proceedings. See Los Angeles Daily Journal,
Sept. 16, 1974, at 19, col. 6; Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 19, 1974, at
20, col. 2.
have been fortunate enough to receive federal pardons for one
reason or another. 19 However, while the states may be able to pro-
tect their individual interests in this manner, the effect may be
disadvantageous in other areas. For example, Mr. Nixon may still
be able to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in a federal judicial proceeding in order to avoid testifying




There has been speculation that Mr. Nixon's pardon is invalid
because it was granted before formal criminal charges had been
brought against him.2 1 Phillip B. Kurland of the University of
Chicago has stated,
A pardon is intended to relieve a person of liability from punish-
ment, to moderate the harshness of the criminal justice system.
But that assumes the system has worked. There is no authority
to anticipate the possibility that criminal charges might sometime
be brought.22
With all due respect to Professor Kurland, and while conceding
the point that possibly justice should not be tempered without first
knowing what justice requires, 23 there is a formidable amount of
authority indicating that a pardon may be issued at any time after
the commission of the offense.
19. Pardons are not always granted because it is felt that a particular
individual happens to be deserving of the benefit.
At early common law, a convicted felon was incompetent to testify in
a judicial proceeding. If a prosecuting attorney's star witness was a con-
victed felon, the prosecutor could remove his disability by obtaining a par-
don for the witness. For example, see Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450
(1891); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 644 (No. 15,493) (C.C.D.N.Y.
1824).
However, the arbitrary refusal of a state to recognize a federal pardon
could work injustice to individuals truly deserving of the benefits bestowed
by a pardon. The problem could be solved by assuming that the state ex-
ecutive's power to grant pardons includes the power to restore an offender
to the rights and privileges of state citizenship (since the state executive
is without power to pardon a federal offense). See People v. Bowen, 43
Cal. 439 (1872), where the Court held that such a restoration was not a
pardon, but nevertheless did not question the governor's authority to make
such a grant.
20. See, Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 623-25 (1896) (Shiras, J., dis-
senting).
21. See Nimmer, Full Airing of Nixon Case Possible Despite Pardon, Los
Angeles Times, Sept. 22, 1974, Part IX at 3, col. 5-6.
22. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 13, col. 1.
23. Nimmer, Full Airing of Nixon Case 'Possible Despite Pardon, Los
Angeles Times, Sept. 22, 1974, Part IX at 3, col. 5-6.
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The [pardon] power ... extends to every offense known to
the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission,
either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency,
or after conviction and judgment.2 4
The power exists so long as any of the legal consequences of an
offense remain.25 Certainly it is indisputable that the legal conse-
quences of an offense-liability for criminal prosecution therefore-
attach to the offender immediately after the commission of the
offense, thus making the offender a proper subject for executive
clemency. It will also be noted that Article II, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution speaks only of "offenses", and not "con-
victions for offenses".
The rationale behind the idea that a pardon may be issued at
any time after the commission of an offense is persuasive. It is
,said that it is
... of slight importance, whether the guilt of the offender be judi-
cially ascertained or not, provided the executive is fully apprised
of the nature of the offense pardoned; for the pardon goes upon
the presumption that the offender, if not already convicted, will be;
else he would not need to plead his pardon to the indictment, but
would be saved under his plea of not guilty.2 6
This is basically the same rationale used by Deputy Attorney
General Laurence H. Silberman in his defense of the Nixon Pardon.
He stated that once a pardon is deemed appropriate, it is difficult
to justify indictment, trial, and conviction; that while critics state
that Nixon could now claim 'he ". . . is innocent and that he was
railroaded from office . . .", this is ". . incredible in the light of
the unanimous action of the House [Judiciary] Committee [rec-
ommending impeachment] and the acceptance of the pardon. '27
Thus:
24. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1867).
Professor Kurland believes this statement to be dictum. Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 13, col. 2. This proposition will be discussed
infra.
See also Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925), however, where the
Court reaffirms the statement from Garland.
25. Stetler's Case, 22 F. Cas. 1314, 1315 (No. 13,380) (C.C.E.D. Penn.
1852).
26. In Re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1060 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1864).
27. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 20, 1974, Part I at 21, col. 1. In all fairness
to Mr. Silberman, it should be noted that he is probably referring to the
The President ... has . . . the power to grant a pardon as well
before conviction as afterwards, because the act of clemency and
grace is applied to the crime itself, not to the mere formal proof
of the crime. 28
These arguments have a great deal of validity when they are
applied to pardons granted to individuals for specific offenses which
they have committed. However, phrases such as "fully apprised
of the nature of the offense pardoned" begin to cause some diffi-
culty when applied to the pardon of Mr. Nixon, not because Presi-
dent Ford made a legal mistake in the timing of the pardon, but
because the words of pardon give no indication whatsoever that
President Ford was fully apprised of the nature of the offense (or
offenses) pardoned.
C. The Recital Of Offenses
"In order to render a pardon valid, it must express with accuracy
the crime intended to be forgiven. '29 It has been held that when
a pardon misrecites an offense, the time of conviction, and/or the
gravity of sentence, it is assumed that the pardoner was not fully
apprised of the gravity of the crime, thus rendering the pardon
void. 0 However, even if the offense is misrecited, the pardon can
be effective if it can be shown that the pardon was intended to
cover a particular crime.8 '
Giving effect to a mistaken pardon is based on the idea that the
pardon is similar to a grant, and thus is to be construed most
strictly against the grantor (or executive) and most beneficially
for the grantee.32 However, the pardons which fall into this cate-
unanimity achieved by the Committee after Mr. Nixon's disclosures of Au-
gust 5, 1974. However, the Committee was not unanimous when it recom-
mended the Articles of Impeachment. See n.6, supra.
28. 6 Op. Arr'VY GN. 20 at 20-21 (1853).
29. 4 Black. Com. 400. See also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 212 at 214; 59 AM.
JUR. 2d, Pardon & Parole § 46 (1971). Note that in the latter two citations
there is nothing contra to the proposition that the offenses pardoned must
be recited in the pardon. One of the cited cases, In Re Greathouse, 10 F.
Cas. 1057 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864), appears to be contra. However,
a reading of the case shows that the issue involved was not whether the
pardon must recite the offense (in fact, the pardon here did recite the of-
fense-treason), but whether the persons pardoned must be individually
identified. It was held that the pardon involved was an amnesty, and that
the persons pardoned could be designated by class. Id. at 1061.
30. Stetler's Case, 22 F. Cas. 1314, 1316 (No. 13,380) (C.C.E.D. Penn.,
1862).
31. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1263, § 4.
32. Carson v. Henslee, 221 Ark. 248, 250, 252 S.W.2d 609, 610, 35 A.L.R.2d
1257, 1260 (1952); Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 475, 484, 47 S.W. 119, 121 (1898);
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gory are merely ambiguous as opposed to being blatantly mistaken.
The general rule is still that in order to be valid and of effect,
a pardon must accurately describe the offense intended to be for-
given.83
The rationale for the requirement that the offenses pardoned be
recited in the pardon is based on the concept that in order for the
executive to effectively pardon an individual for certain actions,
he must be aware of what it is that he is pardoning.
[T]he kings of . . . England ... could grant pardons before
as well as after conviction, and before as well as after indict-
ment. But although it was never asserted in terms that they had
no power to pardon a man of all felonies in general without des-
cribing any one particular felony, the rule of constructing pardons
had the practical effect of denying the existence of any such
power. For whenever it could be apprised that the king, when he
granted pardon, was not fully apprised of both the heinousness of
the crime, and also how far the party stood convicted thereof upon
record, the pardon was held void, as being gained by imposition
upon the king.34
Turning to Mr. Nixon's pardon, it is noted that the pardon pur-
ports to extend to ". .. all offenses against the United States which
he . . . has committed or may have committed or taken part in
during the period from January 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974."
One must necessarily question whether the recital of offenses is
specific or accurate enough to effectuate the pardon. It is painfully
obvious that the pardon does not specify a single offense, and in
fact seems to imply that an offense may not have been committed.
Of course, it could be argued that the pardon is somewhat specific
in that paragraph 2 of the pardon's preamble mentions the fact
see also the argument of counsel, Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 151
(1877).
33. Ex Parte Higgins, 14 Mo. App. 601, 601 (1884); State v. Leak, 5 Ind.
359, 362 (1854).
34. State of Nevada v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64, 71 (1880). The proposition
that fraud vitiates a pardon was questioned in In Re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas.
1057, 1059 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864), and expressly rejected in In
Re Francis B. Edymoin, 8 How. Pr. 478, 484 (N.Y., Cayuga County Ct.,
1853). However, in People ex. rel. Pickard v. Sheriff, 11 N.Y. Civ. Proc.
172 (Chautauga County Ct., 1886), the Court stated that Edymoin ". . . fol-
lows no authority when it attempts to lay down the rule that records, deeds
and papers, fair on their face cannot be impeached." Id. at 180.
It should be noted that even Greathouse and Edymoin impliedly agree
with the proposition that the pardon must recite the offense pardoned.
that the House Judiciary Committee voted in favor of certain
recommended Articles of Impeachment.3 5 Thus, it is possible that
it could be contended that the offenses specified in the Articles of
Impeachment are those which are pardoned. However, there are
several flaws to this argument.
First, the preamble of the pardon strikes one as more of a brief
history of events rather than a specification of offenses committed
by Mr. Nixon. It will be noted that the third paragraph of the
preamble states that as a result of certain acts or omissions, Nixon
has become liable to possible indictment and trial. Yet, this para-
graph never refers to the Articles of Impeachment, nor does it even
infer that the acts or omissions referred to are the same or similar
to acts or omissions which may have formed the basis for the Arti-
cles of Impeachment.
Further, the preamble's paragraph 2 mentions that the impeach-
ment inquiry extended over more than eight months, and that it
received wide publicity. Thus, this paragraph's primary purpose
would appear to be to justify the assertion in paragraph 4 of the
preamble, wherein it is stated that Nixon's trial, if any, could not
fairly begin for over a year (President Ford stated that this was
because of the Watergate atmosphere 6 , the atmosphere undoubt-
edly having been affected by the impeachment proceedings), rather
than to specify the offenses of which Nixon was being pardoned.
In addition, the actual words of clemency which appear in para-
graph 5 of the Presidential Proclamation are devoid of any refer-
ence to the preceding four paragraph preamble. Nixon is simply
pardoned for all offenses which he has committed, may have com-
mitted, or may have taken part in. It is submitted that the words
of the executive grant of clemency are the words which determine
the effect of the grant, and not the words of the preamble preceding
the grant.
This view is strengthened by examining the pardon of George
Burdick. 37 Here, the pardon's preamble specified an offense to an
extent (apparently, obtaining confidential government information
illegally), while the words of the executive grant of clemency were
general as they are in Nixon's pardon. Burdick argued against the
pardon's validity on the grounds that it was too general (this will
be explored in greater depth, infra). Burdick's concern with the
words of the preamble is demonstrated by the fact that in his argu-
ment, he never even considered them. While this might be seen
35. See n.10, supra.
36. See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at p.1, col. 6.
37. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 85-8.6 (1915).
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as an oversight, the United States Supreme Court considered Bur-
dick's argument at some length and, while declining to rule on the
argument,38 the Court made no mention of the preamble, and in
fact did absolutely nothing to point out Burdick's "oversight". This
would appear to indicate that the words of the preamble, or intro-
ductory paragraphs, are of little, if any, value in construing the
words of the actual grant of clemency.
A matter of interest in the Burdick case was that it has been
the only case in front of the United States Supreme Court which
involved a pardon similar in its terms to the pardon of Richard
Nixon. Burdick's pardon read in part:
. . . I . .. do hereby grant to the said George Burdick a full and
unconditional pardon for all offenses against the United States
which he . . . has committed or may have committed, or taken part
in, in connection with the securing, writing about, or assisting in
the publication of information ... concerning which he may be in-
terrogated in the said grand jury proceeding. 39
Burdick refused to accept the pardon, and was held in contempt
for refusing to testify in front of the grand jury. Among other
things, Burdick's attorney argued that,
The interpretation of the language of the Constitution conferring
the pardoning power upon the President contended for the United
States stretches the actual language of the Constitution in that it
makes the word 'offenses' connote conjectural or purely hypotheti-
cal offenses in addition to ascertained events.40
Burdick further argued that the wording of the pardon was pre-
cluded by the constitutional provision giving power only "to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States", and
that not in the imagination or purpose of the executive magistracy
can an offense against the United States be established, but only
by confession or conviction.
41
While devoting some time to these arguments, the Court declined
to rule on them. Instead, the holding that the pardon was inef-
fectual was based on Burdick's rejection of the pardon.
Redd v. State42 involved the ability of a witness to testify after
receiving a
38. Id. at 93.
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. at 81.
41. Id. at 93.
42. 65 Ark. 475, 47 S.W. 119 (1898).
. . . full and free pardon of and from the offenses of burglary and
larceny, or burglary, or larceny, either grand or petit, and of all
felonies of which he may have heretofore been convicted. .. 4
The Court stated that if it could have been shown that the witness
had been convicted of offenses other than those named in the
pardon, it could have been that the terms ". . . and of all felonies
of which he may have been heretofore convicted . . ." would not
have covered such offenses because the executive may not have
been apprised of the heinousness of his crimes, "... but deceived
in his grant. .. 44
While the Arkansas Supreme Court, unlike the United States
Supreme Court, approached the problem of the general pardon, it
merely indicated what it might do in the event it were ever con-
fronted with the situation. At this time there does not appear to
be any court in this country which has decided one way or another
on the validity of a general pardon.
However, given the rule that the offenses pardoned must be
recited in the pardon, it would seem that the general pardon is in
direct contravention of this rule. There are a staggering number
of offenses which may be committed against the United States, and
it is difficult to conceive that the President will be apprised of all
crimes possibly committed by an individual, especially when that
individual will not admit the commission of a single offense. In
other words, had there been evidence that Nixon committed treason
while in office, would President Ford have been so willing to extend
a general pardon so quickly; could President Ford have contem-
plated the possibility that treason, or a multiplicity of other offen-
ses, were committed by Nixon while he was President?
The pardon itself, while general, cannot indicate such contempla-
tion. Further, Mr. Nixon's efforts to suppress any evidence of his
guilt of or complicity in any questionable actions would seem to
indicate that President Ford could not have been apprised of all
offenses committed by Mr. Nixon. It would thus seem that on this
basis, a general pardon, and the pardon of Richard Nixon, would
be invalid.
D. Limitations On The Executive
"The ground for the exercise of the power [of pardon] is wholly
within the discretion of the Executive. ' '45 There are, however,
43. Id. at 484, 47 S.W. at 121.
44. Id. at 485, 47 S.W. at 121.
45. 20 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 330 at 331 (1892).
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several qualifications to this absolute statement. For instance, a
pardon cannot be granted prior to the commission of an offense;
it cannot be extended to a public nuisance, as there would then
be no way to abate the nuisance; nor can it be used to stay im-
peachment proceedings.4 6 Neither can a pardon operate retrospec-
tively to abrogate events which have already occurred.47
The obligations of the President may impose a limitation in them-
iselves.
Before [the President] enter[s] on the Execution of his Office,
he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: 'I do solemly
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of Presi-
dent of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States'.4 8
Further, the President "... shall take Care that the Laws (of the
United States) be faithfully executed...
The power of executive clemency looms as an exception to the
obligation of the executive to see that laws of the nation are faith-
fully executed. By exercising the power of executive clemency, the
President is preventing the consequences of the law's execution.
Insofar as the pardon of Richard Nixon is concerned, the pardon
not only averted the criminal consequences of a judgment of con-
viction, but also precluded even the preliminary workings of the
criminal justice system, the official bringing of charges.
The pardoning power is in derogation of the law. If the laws
could always be enacted and administered so as to be just in every
circumstance, there would be no need for pardons.50 It follows that
46. Ex Parte William Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 312 (1855).
47. In Re Spencer, 22 F. Cas. 921, 923 (No. 13,234) (C.C.D. Ore. 1878).
Probably the most dramatic example of this limitation is where rights
have vested in property prior to the granting of the pardon. "The power
of pardoning is not an absolute unlimited power of dispensing with the op-
eration of laws which vest an interest or right in a private citizen, or which
are designed to secure to him the enjoyment of his property, or give him
damages against a wrongdoer . .. Out of its legitimate sphere, a pardon
is void . . . [T]he grantor of a pardon, cannot release, acquit, and abrogate
a private right and interest vested in a third person." 5 Op. ATr'Y. GEN.
532 at 535-37 (1852).
See also, 10 Op. ATr'Y. GEN. 452 (1863); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S.
149, 153-54 (1877).
48. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
50. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 632, 228 P. 82, 86 (1924); see also,
67 C.J.S. Pardon § 2 (1950).
if the pardon power is in derogation of the law, it is also in
derogation of the President's obligation to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. Consequently, it appears that the power of
executive clemency is limited by the executive's primary obligation
of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed to the extent that
executive clemency only be exercised in good faith for the purpose
of preventing the injustice which would result from a blind admini-
stration of the law in every case.
The Court, in Delany v. Shobe,5 ' a case which involved state
executive clemency, stated that the governors of most states are
• . .vested with a general power to reprieve, commute and pardon
* . . The executive's prerogative of reprieve, commutation and par-
don are at the governor's own discretion to be exercised without
limitation, except in good faith, and for which he owes no account-
ing. [emphasis added] 52
It is not enough, however, to state that the power of executive
clemency is subject to a requirement of good faith. The primary
problem is what remedies are available in the event the power is
exercised in bad faith. Unfortunately, the remedies, as they have
thus far been enumerated, are rather limited.
In Ex Parte Grossman,5 3 the Court dealt with the pardon of an
individual who had been held in contempt of court. The Court
stated:
To exercise [executive clemency] to the extent of destroying the
deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert [the
power of executive clemency]; but whoever is to make it useful
must have full discretion to exercise it.54
The Court went on to say that exceptional cases, such as where
the President abused his constitutional power by granting excessive
pardons which deprived the courts of power to enforce their orders
"... would suggest a resort to impeachment rather than to a
narrow and strained construction of the general powers of the
President."55
The remedy suggested by the Court may be appropriate in certain
circumstances, but if it exists as the sole remedy, it is far too drastic.
51. 235 F. Supp. 662 (D. Ore. 1964).
52. Id. at 667. In California at least, the power is somewhat more lim-
ited. The governor must report each exercise of clemency to the legislature
along with his reason for the exercise of the power. Further, the governor
may not grant a pardon or commutation to a person twice convicted of a
felony without the recommendation of the California Supreme Court, fourjustices concurring. See CALIF. CONST. art. V, § 8.
53. 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id. at 121.
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Among other things, President Ford pardoned Nixon ostensibly for
reasons of Nixon's health,56 and also for the purpose of preventing
a former President from being subjected to a long criminal prosecu-
tion after spending much of his life in the service of the country.5 7
Whether these are valid reasons for a pardon is questionable.
Undoubtedly there are many defendants in poor health who are
still prosecuted. Of course, there are exceptions such as where a
death sentence is stayed until the condemned prisoner recovers his
health, or where a defendant becomes insane during the criminal
proceedings, the proceedings are stayed and the defendant is com-
mitted to an institution until he recovers his sanity. However, none
of these characteristics are present in the Nixon pardon, for here
the legal machinery of the criminal justice system has been com-
pletely and permanently halted.
The desire that a former president not be prosecuted in conjunc-
tion with the health reason can be appealing, but when applied to
the Nixon Pardon, a disturbing factor emerges. That is, President
Ford became President solely by virtue of his appointment to the
office of vice-president by former President Nixon. When this
factor becomes a part of the picture, President Ford's subjective
reasons for the pardon become less appealing, and the pardon begins
to take the appearance of a returned political favor.58 While there
is no hard evidence that this is any more than coincidence and
unfortunate appearance, one cannot escape the inference that there
here existed a conflict of interest which could have only been
resolved by an impartial determination of the propriety of this par-
ticular pardon.
While some of the stated reasons for the pardon (e.g., the desire
to heal the -divisiveness in the nation) are laudible, it appears prob-
able (and, indeed, it is even understandable) that President Ford
did not want to see the prosecution of the man who made his eleva-
tion to the office of President possible, and that this latter consid-
56. Supra, n.9.
57. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 1, col. 6; Id. at 12, col. 3.
58. It has been reported that prior to the pardon, Nixon's acceptance
draft was taken to the White House where it underwent extensive rewrit-
ing. The White House did not want Nixon saying something in his accept-
ance and then reneging a few sentences later. Los Angeles Times, Sept.
9, 1974, Part I at 13, col. 5.
eration played a part in deciding whether to grant the pardon.
Understandable though it may be, it is submitted that this latter
consideration is hardly a valid ground for the exercise of executive
clemency.
If it is assumed that, because of this, President Ford exercised
the power of executive clemency in bad faith, the Court in Gross-
man would still hold the pardon effective and further hold that the
only remedy is the impeachment of President Ford. This might be
justified if it could be shown that President Ford acted in flagrant
and intentional disregard of his constitutional obligations, but this
does not appear to be the case. At most, it would appear that
President Ford is guilty of an emotional and subjective reaction to
a situation, that is, the desire to save a man who conferred a great
benefit upon him.
Impeachment is too drastic a remedy for what is probably at
worst a judgmental error with its base in emotion, and is thus
inadequate. It should be possible to examine the pardon on an ob-
jective basis, and thus establish its validity or invalidity. This will
be further explored infra.
III. ACCEPTANCE
A. Acceptance As A Prerequisite
A presidential pardon has been analogized to a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, with delivery not being com-
plete without an acceptance.59 Thus, a pardon, to become effective,
must be accepted.60 While delivery and acceptance are essential
to a valid pardon, the mere lack of an expressed affirmative accep-
59. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161 (1833); see also 59 AM.
JuR. 2d, Pardon & Parole, § 47 (1971).
60. Ex Parte Perovich, 9 F.2d 124, 125 (D.C., D. Kan. 1925). Even this
rule is not absolute, however. The decision in Ex Parte Perovich was re-
versed by the Supreme Court in Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1926),
where the Court stated that under certain circumstances the public welfare
and not the individual's acceptance shall determine the effect of a pardon.
Id. at 486. The case involved the reduction of a sentence from death to
life imprisonment, and the prisoner's refusal to accept such a reduction.
An interesting point was made by the Court in Ex Parte Perovich when
it stated that while a commutation (a reduction in the degree of punish-
ment) is within the President's power, an entire change in the nature and
character of the punishment is not. 9 F.2d at 125. The Court considered
the reduction of sentence in this case as a change in the nature of punish-
ment rather than a commutation.
In Biddle v. Perovich, the Court did not pass upon this question of power,
but instead held that the reduction was a commutation, and that consent
was not required for a commutation. 274 U.S. at 487.
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tance does not necessarily invalidate the pardon, for as an absolute
pardon is " . . . highly beneficial to the grantee, an acceptance of
it . . . , in the absence of any proof to the contrary, must be pre-
sumed."61
However, a pardon may be rejected by the person to whom it
is tendered. If it is rejected, it ordinarily cannot be forced upon
him. 6 2
B. The Consequences of Acceptance
1. Ex Parte Garland
Ex Parte Garland63 was a 5-4 decision involving a loyalty oath
prescribed by Congress which was required of an attorney prior
to his being admitted to practice before the federal courts. Garland
had held office in the Confederacy during the Civil War, and after
the war 'had received a presidential pardon for all offenses commit-
ted by his participation, direct or implied, in the rebellion.
4
The Court, in deciding that Garland could practice law before
the federal courts, discussed the nature and effect of an accepted
pardon, and stated:
[The pardon] power of the President is not subject to legislative
control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor
exclude from its exercise any class of offenders ... A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punish-
ment and blots out the existence of the guilt, so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense . . . [It] makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives
him a new credit and capacity.6 5
The problem with Ex Parte Garland's interpretation of the
pardon power is that it was not necessary to the decision of the
61. Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 475, 485, 47 S.W. 119, 122 (1898); see also
Ex Parte Powell, 73 Ala. 517, 519-20 (1883).
62. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915).
63. 71 U.S. 333 (1867).
64. Id. at 333 and 375.
65. Id. at 380-81. See also United States v. Klien, 80 U.S. 128, 147(1872); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1872).
In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), it was stated that if a witness
had received a pardon, ". . . he cannot longer set up his privilege [against
self-incrimination], since he stands with respect to such offense as if it had
never been committed." Id. at 599.
case. Prior to discussing the pardon, the Court had already invali-
dated the loyalty oath on the grounds that it was a bill of
attainder, 66 that it was ex post facto,6 7 and that it constituted an
unwarranted legislative incursion into the judicial power.6 After
invalidating the oath on these grounds, the Court stated, "This view
is strengthened by a consideration of the effect of the pardon ...
and the nature of the pardoning power of the President."6 9
With regard to whether a pardon blots out guilt, it should also
be noted that Garland's counsel drew a distinction between pardon
and amnesty, appearing to assume that amnesty rather than pardon
was the basis for restoration of Garland's rights, 70 and he stated
as follows:
[P]ardon is usually granted to an individual; amnesty to a
class of persons . . . Pardon usually follows a conviction, and its
effect is to remit the penalty. Amnesty usually precedes, but it
may follow trial and conviction, and its effect is to obliterate the
past . . .to place the offender exactly in the position which he
occupied before the offense was committed.71
The effect of the Garland case is further undermined by a con-
sideration of the time during which the case was decided. The Civil
War had just ended and reconstruction was in process. During the
time of the war and for a number of years following, there were
a number of amnesties and pardons extended to the people of the
Confederacy. It could be that the Court felt that in order to heal
the wounds of division, it was required to construe the effect of
a pardon as it did.
7 2
66. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 377 (1867).
67. Id. at 377.
68. Id. at 378-79.
69. Id. at 380.
70. Id. at 348-52, generally. While the Supreme Court has generally
stated that the distinction between pardon and amnesty is not recognized
in the United States, it has still taken pains to point out the differences
between the two concepts, the distinction being basically the same as that
made by Garland's counsel. See 'Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601-02
(1896); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152-53. For further discussions
of amnesty, see In re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1060 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1864); 20 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 330 (1892); 1 Op. AT 'Y GEN. 227, 228
(1865).
71. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 351 (1867).
72. As a matter of interest, one might analogize this latter consideration
to the desire to heal the nation's divisiveness after Watergate. A pardon
granted solely upon such considerations could be said to be in the public
interest, and one cannot really quarrel with the propriety of such a reason,
even if it is factually in error.
The section of this comment entitled "Limitations On The Executive", su-
pra, does not take the position that such a reason would be an invalid
ground for the exercise of executive clemency. Rather, it points out factors
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2. Departure From Garland
In 1877, ten years after the decision in Garland, the Supreme
Court in Knote v. United States73 impliedly placed a limitation on
the effect of a pardon, stating:
A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from
the consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable
and within control of the pardoning power . .. [I] t so far blots out
the offense that . . . it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the
assertion of his legal rights.74
The language here indicates that a pardon will be construed to
blot out guilt only so far as is necessary for the pardoned individual
to regain his legal rights, rather than a complete obliteration of
the offense. In 1926, the Supreme Court held:
A pardon . .. is not a private act of grace from an individual
happening to possess power ... When granted it is the determina-
tion of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better
served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.75
Basically, this statement implies that hereafter a pardon will be
construed only as remitting the consequences (either in whole or
in part) of an offense, rather than obliterating the offense itself.
Thus,
... a pardon exempts an individual from punishment which the
law inflicts for the crime which he has committed; and generally
which would raise an inference of a conflict of interest and poses a hypo-
thetical question of validity should these factors be the only true reasons
behind the pardon.
It should also be noted that the divisiveness caused by the Civil War was
vastly different than the divisiveness caused by Watergate. The former was
characterized by a vicious hatred and warfare in which Americans killed
other Americans in an attempt to physically split the nation into two sep-
arate, sovereign, political entities. The latter, on the other hand, was char-
acterized by nonviolent (at least in terms of physical action) differences
in opinion, a situation which, incidently, is supposed to characterize a free
society.
Further, it should be noted that Garland did not involve the President's
reasons for granting a pardon, or the validity of the pardon. Rather, it in-
volved the issue of what effect should be given a valid absolute pardon
when accepted.
For a discussion of the Civil War pardons, see 20 OP. ATT'Y. GEN. 330
at 334-39 (1892).
73. 95 U.S. 149 (1877).
74. Id. at 153.
75. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1926).
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speaking, it also removes any disqualifications and disabilities
which would ordinarily have followed from the conviction ...
[But a] person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted crim-
inal, though pardoned . . .76
The State of New York was perhaps the hardest on the Garland
doctrine. In People ex. rel. Prisament v. Brophy,7 7 a case where
the defendant was sentenced as a second offender on the basis of
a prior federal offense which had been absolutely pardoned, the
Court said:
Literally, .... an executive pardon cannot 'blot out the existence
of guilt' of one who committed a crime. At most it can wipe out
the legal consequences which flow from an adjudication of guilt
• . . The Constitution . . . does not confer upon [the President]
the power to wipe out guilt.78
The New York Court of Appeals stated further that it felt that
the United States Supreme Court had rejected the implications of
Garland.79
Thus, the current prevailing view would appear to coincide with
the idea that a pardon " . . .. does not restore an ex-convict to a
state of innocence nor in any way represent that he is as honest,
reliable, and upright as if he had constantly maintained the char-
acter of a law abiding citizen."80 "[A] pardon of a convicted felon
does not restore his character. . . It implies guilt and does not wash
out the moral stain."8'
It has been said that the grant of clemency ought not appear
76. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 511, 71 P.2d 214, 216 (1937). This
case involved the sentencing of the defendant as a habitual criminal on the
basis of two prior Texas felonies which had been pardoned by the governor
of Texas. The Court stated that ". . it is the second or subsequent offense
which is punished, not the first . . . [I]n determining the nature of the
penalty to be inflicted, the legislature is justified in taking into considera-
tion the previous criminal conduct of the defendant." Id. at 512, 71 P.2d at
216.
See also, 8 CALIF. Op. ATr'y. GEN. 87 (1946).
77. 287 N.Y. 142, 38 N.E.2d 468 (1941), cert. den. 317 U.S. 625 (1942).
78. Id. at 136-38, 38 N.E.2d at 470-71. See also, Ex Parte Garland, 71
U.S. 333, 396 (1867) (Miller, J., dissenting).
79. People ex. rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 137, 38 N.E.2d 468,
470 (1941).
80. NOTE, 4 CALIF. L. REv. 236 at 237 (1916).
81. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 514, 71 P.2d 214, 217 (1937).
A related problem to character involves the credibility of a witness who
was convicted of a felony and later pardoned. While it has long been rec-
ognized that a pardon removes a felon's disability to testify as a witness,
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453-54 (1891); People v. Bowen, 43 Cal.
439, 442 (1872), it has also been recognized that such a witness' credibility
may still be suspect. People v. Biggs, supra at 514, 71 P.2d at 217; United
States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 644, 648 (No. 15,493) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1824).
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as a finding of innocence.8 2 A pardon would therefore carry an
imputation of guilt while an acceptance of the pardon is a confes-
sion of guilt. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that a pardon requires the grantee to " . . . confess his guilt in
order to avoid a conviction of it.''83
There can be no pardon where there is no actual or imputed guilt.
The acceptance of a pardon is a confession of guilt, or the existence
of a state of facts from which a judgment of guilt would follow.8 4
At this point, it would be appropriate to examine Mr. Nixon's
acceptance of his pardon.
3. Nixon's Acceptance
Assuming a valid pardon and acceptance, Nixon's pardon more
than likely means the end of his political and legal career.
. . . [W]hile [a] pardon dispenses with punishment, it cannot
change character, and where character is a qualification for an
office, a pardoned offense as much as an unpardoned offense is evi-
dence of a lack of the necessary qualification.8 5
One interesting development which has arisen is that Nixon is
considering suing for the back taxes he paid,88 presumably on the
ground that the pardon covered any charges which might have been
brought against him for tax evasion. The idea is clever, and if
Nixon had not already paid the back taxes, it is possible that he
might be in a position to resist their collection.
However, the money has already been paid to the Treasury.
[A pardon] does not make amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender ...it does not
give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor does
it impose upon the government any obligation to give it...87
82. 23 Op. ATr'Y. Gm. 360 at 370 (1901).
83. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
84. 11 Op. A2.r'y. GEN. 227 at 228 (1865).
"All pardons, except in cases of illegal convictions, etc., proceed upon
the hypothesis of the legal guilt of the person pardoned. If he be not guilty,
it is presumed that he will be acquitted, and he has no need of a pardon.
The pardon is granted on considerations which satisfy the executive that
in the particular case, an offender, though guilty, should be pardoned." In
re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1060 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864).
85. Williston, "Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt?," 28 HARv. L. REV. 645
at 657 (1915).
86. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at 11, col. 1.
87. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1877).
The pardon power of the President cannot " . . . touch moneys in
the treasury of the United States, except [as] expressly authorized
by act of Congress."'8
Thus, the back taxes paid by Nixon are out of President Ford's
control. The pardon can have no effect on this money; Mr. Nixon
has lost it forever.
Inasmuch as a pardon is an imputation of guilt and the acceptance
of a pardon is a confession of guilt,8 9 an interesting question is to
what offenses has Mr. Nixon admitted guilt. It has been reported
that the Special Prosecutor's office was investigating Nixon on ten
separate matters. 0 Because of its generality, the pardon would
necessarily include all ten matters, and Mr. Nixon's acceptance
should theoretically admit his guilt or complicity in all these
matters.
This question is not only made complicated by the generality of
the pardon, but also by Nixon's acceptance, which at no point con-
ceded criminal guilt.9 1 In fact, not only has it been reported that
Nixon's attorney was holding out against any admission of legal
guilt,92 but according to Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former White
House Chief of Staff, Nixon " . . . still believes he is innocent of
committing an impeachable offense. .... ,,93
88. Id. at 154. See also, 10 Op. ATT'Y. GEm. 452 at 453 (1863).
89. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
90. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 11, 1974, Part I at 8, col. 1. The matters
being investigated were:
1. Nixon's gift of his vice-presidential papers;
2. Nixon's use of campaign contributions for his own personal
benefit;
3. The connection between a dairy industry promise of campaign
contributions and an increase in the milk price support level;
4. The handling of FBI wiretap records;
5. Obstruction of justice in the Ellsberg break-in case;
6. Wiretapping allegedly directed at private citizens;
7. Misuse of Internal Revenue Service information;
8. Misuse of the Internal Revenue Service through attempts to in-
itiate audits of political enemies;
9. Misuse of the Federal Communications Commission in a chal-
lenge to ownership of television stations by the Washington
Post;
10. Nixon's involvement in false testimony given before the Senate
regarding the ITT case.
91. Supra, n.11. See also Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1974, Part I at
1, col. 6.
92. Halpern, "What The Pardon Tells Us About Mr. Ford," Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 12, 1974, Part II at 7, col. 2.
93. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 1974, Part I at 10, col. 1.
"All Nixon says is that he regrets not acting 'more decisively about Wa-
tergate', and he has never admitted to and will never admit to anything
worse than indecision. Of course the June 23, 1972 tape shows that he acted
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The attitude demonstrated by Mr. Nixon is not quite consistent
with several principles behind the concept of a pardon. "When men
have offended against the law, their appeal is for mercy, not
justice.9 4 A pardon " . . . is an act of sovereign clemency toward
the guilty, and not of justice for the innocent. .. "95
Even when confronted with the idea that acceptance of a pardon
is presumed absent proof to the contrary, 96 here Mr. Nixon has
demonstrated that he is not willing to confess any guilt whatsoever,
an attitude which is directly opposed to the idea that an acceptance
is a confession of guilt. A pardon " . . . is a deed of mercy given
without other fee or reward than the good faith, truth, and
repentance of the culprit. '97 Yet, if wrongdoing is denied, how can
there be repentence; and if wrongdoing has in fact taken place, does
not a denial of such wrongdoing constitute both a lack of good faith
and a lack of truthfulness?
In United States v. Wilson,9 the United States Attorney General
argued that it was an ancient doctrine that a plea of not guilty
waived a pardon; that such a plea is the equivalent of a refusal
to accept the pardon.9 9 Although the Court decided in favor of
the United States on another ground (that the pardon must be
pleaded in order to be effective), the argument is convincing, and
it is submitted that Nixon, by his attitude with regard to the
pardon, has demonstrated that he will continue to insist on his
innocence, and that as a consequence, he has waived his pardon.
However, the question which must necessarily be considered is
what was Nixon to do if he genuinely believed in his innocence,
yet realized the risk of prosecution and public trial. The law is
somewhat harsh in this respect, for it has been stated that if a
person is not guilty, he has no need of a pardon, for it is presumed
that he will be acquitted. 100
decisively to obstruct justice." Will, Ford's Action Takes Its Toll on Our
Principles, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13, 1974, Part II at 7, col. 4.
94. 11 Op. AT'Y. GEN. 227 at 230 (1865).
95. NOTE, 4 CALIF. L. REv. 236 at 237 (1916).
96. Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 475, 485, 47 S.W. 119, 122 (1898); Ex Parte
Powell, 73 Ala. 517, 520 (1883).
97. 11 Op. ATT'Y. GE . 227 at 229-30 (1865).
98. 32 U.S. 150 (1833).
99. Id. at 156.
100. In re Greathouse, 10 F. Cas. 1057, 1060 (No. 5,741) (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1864).
While the pardon's validity does not appear to be affected by the
timing of the pardon, supra, timing is the real problem here. If
President Ford would (or could) have waited until a verdict had
been rendered for or against Nixon (or at the very least, until
indictment or plea), the dilemma of the uncertainty of Nixon's guilt
or innocence may then have been obviated.
IV. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
The establishing of the Office of the Watergate Special Prosecu-
tion Force ' ° 1 poses another obstacle to Nixon's pardon. The regula-
tion which governs the Special Prosecution Force gives the Special
Prosecutor
... full authority for investigating and prosecuting offenses against
the United States arising out of the unauthorized entry into Demo-
cratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate, all
offenses arising out of the 1972 Presidential Election for which the
Special Prosecutor deems it necessary and appropriate to assume
responsibility, allegations involving the President, members of the
White House Staff, or Presidential appointees, and any other mat-
ters which he consents to have assigned to him by the Attorney
General.
In particular, the Special Prosecutor shall have full authority
with respect to the above matters for . . . [d]eciding whether or
not to prosecute any individual, firm, corporation or group of
individuals. 102
On November 19, 1973, an amendment was added to the regula-
tion, the amendment reading in part:
In accordance with assurances given by the President to the At-
torney General that the President will not exercise his constitu-
tional powers . . . to limit the independence that [the Special
Prosecutor] is hereby given, . . . the jurisdiction of the Special
Prosecutor will not be limited without the President's first consult-
ing with such Members of Congress (the Majority and Minority
leaders and chairmen, and ranking minority members of the Judi-
ciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives) and
ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with his proposed
action.103
The regulation, in effect, delegates certain powers to the Special
Prosecutor and guarantees that he will be independent in the use
of that power. In fact, the Amendment of November 19, 1973 ex-
pressly limits the exercise of the President's constitutional powers
when the exercise of such power would limit the Special Prosecu-
tor's jurisdiction. The power of executive clemency is a constitu-
101. 38 Fed. Reg. 30738 (1973).
102. Id. at 30738-39.
103. Id. at 32805.
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tional power, and to the extent that the exercise of that power
would limit the Special Prosecutor's jurisdiction, the power falls
within the terms of the regulation. Further, it has been said that
. the authority conferred on the special prosecutor [is] not only
'full' but exclusive, and ... matters within his authority were
immune from interference from the ... President. 04
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon'0 5
considered the regulation governing the Special Prosecutor and
held that so long as the regulation delegating to the Special
Prosecutor the authority to represent the United States in the
Watergate affair is existent,
... it has the force of law . . . [T] he Executive Branch is bound
by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of
the three branches is bound to respect and enforce it.106
This holding has been interpreted by some to be stating that by
taking part in the promulgation of the regulation, the President
has waived his constitutional powers to control matters within the
jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor's office.10 7 While it may be
argued that the constitutional powers of the Executive Branch of
government cannot be infringed by a Congressional statute, the
argument completely misinterprets the source of this regulation.
The regulation is not, repeat, is not a Congressional statute.
Rather, it is a declaration of policy enacted by the Executive Branch
itself. The only part Congress played in this matter was that it
enacted the statutes under which the Executive Branch claimed the
power to promulgate the regulation. 08
In Nader v. Bork,10 9 the Court, in considering an almost identical
104. Lazarus, "Nixon's Pardon Is Open To Legal Challenge," Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 26, 1974, Part II at 7, col. 3.
The idea that the President would delegate or limit his power of execu-
tive clemency with regard to matters within the Special Prosecutor's sphere
is not entirely novel (although the particular facts here involved may be).
"[The] [p]ower of executive clemency . . . has traditionally rested in gov-
ernors or the President, although some of that power is often delegated to
agencies such as pardon or review boards." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S.
9, 12 (1950), reh. den. 339 U.S. 926 (1950).
105. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
106. Id. at 695-96.
107. Lazarus, "Nixon's Pardon Is Open To Legal Challenge," Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 26, 1974, Part II at 7, col. 2.
108. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 301 (1967); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 509-10 (1968).
109. 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.C.D.C. 1973).
regulation, stated that the regulation was binding on the body
which issued it, and that by promulgating the regulation, the
Attorney General had voluntarily limited his own broad author-
ity.11 This concept was expanded to include the entire Executive
Branch in United States v. Nixon."'
In United States v. Mitchell," 2 the Court stated:
The current Special Prosecutor [Jaworski] is vested with the
powers and authority of his predecessor [Cox] pursuant to regula-
tions which have the force of law . . .The Special Prosecutor's
independence has been affirmed and reaffirmed by the Presi-
dent and his representatives, and a unique guarantee of unfettered
operation accorded him: 'the jurisdiction of the Special Prosecutor
will not be limited without the President's first consulting such
members of Congress (the leaders of both Houses and the respec-
tive Committees on the Judiciary) and ascertaining that their con-
sensus is in accord with his proposed action'. 11 [emphasis added]
The Court went on to say that since the President (then Nixon)
had not consulted such members of Congress, " . . . his attempt
to abridge the Special Prosecutor's independence with the argument
that he cannot seek evidence from the President by court process
is a nullity. .. u14 [emphasis added]
Never, at any time, did the President object to the regulation
relating to the Special Prosecutor promulgated by the Attorney
General, and these regulations clearly proscribed activities on the
President's part which he was otherwise free to undertake. The
President's silence with regard to the regulation promulgated by
the branch of government over which he is the head can only be
construed as his acquiescence in that regulation. Whether or not
the President now feels that the regulation now in existence was
a wise or an unwise limitation on his constitutional power, it still
has the force of law, and the President is bound by the conse-
quences of its enforcement.
[ *T]he President is not above the law's command
Sovereignty remains at all times with the people, and they do not
forfeit through elections the right to have the law construed against
and applied to every citizen. 1 '
110. Id. at 108. The Court further stated, "An agency's power to revoke
its regulations is not unlimited-such action must be neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable." Id. at 108.
The Court in this case held that, by virtue of the regulation, the firing
of Archibald Cox, the first Special Prosecutor, was illegal. Id. at 109-10.
111. Supra, n.106.
112. 377 F. Supp. 1326 (D.C.D.C. 1974), ajf'd, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
113. Id. at 1329.
114. Id. at 1329.
115. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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It is thus submitted that the pardon of Richard Nixon deprived
the Special Prosecutor of jurisdiction over a matter within 'his
authority, that is, a potential defendant in a Watergate related
prosecution. As such, the Special Prosecutor's jurisdiction was
limited without resort to the procedures mandated by the regula-
tion. Since the regulation has the force of law, it is further sub-
mitted that the exercise by the President of a constitutional power
(that is, the power of executive clemency) in contravention of the
regulation was invalid and of no effect.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, it is submitted that a pardon and the acceptance thereof
should be construed as follows:
A pardon is an act of executive clemency exercised (except when
it expressly states that it is the result of an illegal or mistaken con-
viction) as an act of sovereign mercy toward one guilty of an
offense against the United States, where an impartial administra-
tion of the law and its consequences would result in unfairness, in-justice, and undue harshness and hardship to the grantee of the
pardon. The pardon must specifically identify the offenses par-
doned in the words which are construed as the grant of clemency
and, absent special circumstances which should be identified in the
preamble of the pardon, the pardon should not be granted prior
to the time of conviction and judgment.
The acceptance of a pardon is an acknowledgement by the
grantee that he is guilty of the offenses contained therein. A denial
of such guilt by the grantee will be construed to be a rejection of
the pardon.
Further, if the Executive should voluntarily waive or limit his
power of executive clemency in certain circumstances, such power
may not be exercised under such circumstances absent a lawful res-
cision of such waiver or limitation.
One unfortunate aspect of this particular area of the law is that,
while there are many decisions regarding pardons, many of these
decisions are inconsistent and some are downright contradictory.
Despite this, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly
overruled or disapproved in any of its decisions a prior inconsistent
Supreme Court decision on the pardon power. Because of this, one
cannot predict with any certainty what the Supreme Court will
do when confronted with another pardon case, but instead can only
speculate as to what might happen.
One can be fairly certain that the Supreme Court would not
reject a pardon case at this time because it felt it did not have
jurisdiction to review the scope of the President's power of execu-
tive clemency. A President's actions are not immune from judicial
review merely because he is President.)1 6 Further, ". . . it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. 11 7 Deciding whether one of the branches of
government exceeds whatever authority has been committed by the
Constitution ". . . is a responsibility of [the Supreme] Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." 1 8
This comment takes the position that the Nixon pardon is invalid
and/or -ineffective on the grounds that it does not recite the offenses
pardoned, that the pardon was impliedly rejected by Nixon because
of his assertions of innocence, and that the pardon was in direct
contravention of the Special Prosecutor's regulation. However, the
comment does not take the position that the pardon should be chal-
lenged in the courts. Rather, that decision is left to the conscience
of the individual or individuals who may have standing to challenge
the pardon, and this comment does not purport to state who might
have such standing.
It is unfortunate that this area of the law is rather ambiguous,
for as a result, no .concrete guidelines can be stated for the exercise
of the power of executive clemency. Possibly for this reason,
judicial review of Nixon's pardon would be desirable with the view
of obtaining a fresh determination of the constitutional scope of
the pardon power, and the limitations which may be imposed upon
it to preclude its abuse.1 19
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